Introduction
As a term, genocide is a relatively recent concept, devised by the lawyer Raphael Lemkin in 1944 as a response to the organised, mechanised, and institutionalised killings that were an integral part of the Nazi regime during the Second World War. For Lemkin, Genocide was "an old practice in its modern development". 1 It was not that the killings were necessarily greater in number than previous events of mass murder, or that the cultural imperialism they reflected was a new phenomenon in Europe. Rather, that the systems, structures, and technologies of modernity enabled the Nazis to undertake a process of isolation, denigration, and destruction in a more organised and orchestrated way that had happened previously. The destruction, not limited to but particularly targeted at the Jewish population of occupied Europe saw systematic abuse, disempowerment, cultural destruction, and, eventually, the murder of millions, many in purpose-built death camps. For Lemkin, this industrialisation of the processes of discrimination and killing required a new language:
"new conceptions require new terms. By genocide we mean the destruction of a nation or ethnic group … a coordinated plan of different actions aimed at the destruction of essential foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of the destruction of the group themselves ". 2 Genocide is more than mass murder and cultural and economic domination: it is the biological, cultural, and social disintegration of a targeted group. In his work detailing the new terminology of genocide, Lemkin 3 describes the "techniques of genocide" in different spheres of human existence, and particularly in relation to the conditions of life brought to bear on Jews in Nazi Germany. For Lemkin, the 1 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposal for redress (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944) 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. iii Nazi genocide was a planned and deliberate attempt to undermine and then destroy the Jewish population in all aspects of life: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral. It was, as he described it, "an elaborate, almost scientific system, developed to an extent never before achieved by any nation." 4 Subsequently codified by the United Nations in 1951, Genocide has become the focus of several international courts including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, the Interterminal criminal tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) founded in 1998. These legal bodies represent a voice for the international community and a statement of intent when it comes to collective action on the continued perpetration of a crime that will "shock the conscience of humanity." 5
The international bodies responsible for prosecuting genocide are not without their critics. For instance, the professor of international Law, William Schabas, 6 identifies issues with the definitions of genocide used in international legislation. Barria and Roper 7 are sceptical on the impact of the early international tribunals in both prosecuting individuals and in contributing to more lasting peace in the regions. There are also critiques on the role that the International Criminal Court in sovereign states, particularly in Africa, where Abdul Tejan-Cole 8 argues that the work of the ICC in Africa has opened it up to criticisms of neo-colonialism on that continent. This is a position taken by the African Union, who have persistently criticized the ICCs involvement in African Affairs and have gone as far as to recommend that its member 4 Rights, 9, no. 3 (2005), 349-368. 8 Abdul Tejan-Cole, "Is the ICC's exclusively African case docket a legitimate and appropriate intervention or an unfair targeting of Africans?" in Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 366-379 iv states do not comply with ICC arrest warrants. Nevertheless, many argue that the international tribunals and the ICC have had a significant and positive impact. For instance, Hyearn and Simmons 9 , Bassiouni and Hansen 10 , and Hillebrecht 11 all see the prosecutions and the wider work of the international tribunals and courts as an opportunity to establish international norms around prosecuting genocide, changing habits and deterring, or at least dampening the extent of future genocidal events. This paper examines the impact of international efforts towards prosecuting genocide, considering the legislative journey the crime has been through, the prosecutions for genocide to date, and the difficulties around the politicization of the international courts.
Structure and data
The paper is in three parts. The first part examines the history of genocide legislation, in particular the international legal frameworks established since Lemkin first devised the term in 1944. The second part details the extent of genocide prosecutions to date, employing material from various international criminal tribunals, the ICC, national courts, and, where necessary, media accounts contemporary with the events. The final part of the paper illustrates the politics involved in genocide prosecutions through a case study of ICC involvement in Africa and the failed extradition of Sudanese president Omar Al Bashir. The case study uses a range of secondary sources, including documents from the ICC, the African Union, National Governments, and other contemporary accounts. 
Legislating Genocide: from Lemkin to the ICC
The first significant appearance of the term genocide after Lemkin's inception of the term in 1944 was during the trials in Nuremburg and Tokyo after the Second World War. These trials were based on two important pieces of legislation: the "Charter of the International Military Tribunal", which was presented in June 1945 and formed the basis for the trials of Nazi party members at Nuremburg 12 ; and in September 1945, the "International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter", which was the basis for trials of Japanese prisoners in Tokyo. The subsequent prosecutions were in-part the realisation of the The legislation adopted as part of the trials at Nuremburg and Tokyo were important for several reasons. Common to both trials was a list of three crimes: Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity 14 , one of the first occasions on which such serious acts of widespread violence, aggression, and destruction were codified at an international level. Although the term genocide was not listed as a crime at either trial, it was referred to during the hearings. More broadly, both trials contributed to the concept of achievable international justice and standards around serious crimes that constituted violations of individual and collective liberties. The Charter and judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal included a series of "Principles of International Law" that were subsequently adopted by the vii bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(f) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 18 The "Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide" was the first human rights treaty adopted by the United Nations General assembly. It uses much of the same language and precedents set out in the "Principles of International Law" recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, particularly around the culpability of perpetrators and the responsibility of the international community in prosecuting the crime.
Although there is some evidence to show that the term genocide was used in at least one successful prosecution before 1990, in Equatorial Guinea (as detailed in next section of this paper), it is generally accepted that the legislation governing genocide was not acted upon, certainly at an international level, until the early 1990s when the United Nations used the Genocide Convention to establish the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR). There are several reasons for this period of inactivity, chief among them was the international paralysis caused by the Cold War, lack of consensus across the UN, and, as Schabas 19 points out, a practical difficulty in that "the Genocide Convention does not establish a monitoring mechanism". Nevertheless, in 1993 the Although the ICTY and ICTR were the first international use of the genocide conventions, Schabas 21 is somewhat circumspect about the application of the legislation in these courts, describing "a restrictive approach to interpretation of the definition of genocide, which was made evident in the two ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda". This critique is supported by Barria and Roper, 22 who identify a range of difficulties with ICTY and ICTR, for example that some of the "problems of the tribunals are due to the nature of international humanitarian law and their broad mandate." 23 This is not to say that these tribunals were without merit; it is important to note that they did signify a willingness on the part of the international community to focus on some of the most extreme cases of statesanctioned and organized violence. Nevertheless, it was some of the perceived failings of the ICTY and ICTR that were part of the "primary justifications for the creation of an International Criminal Court" 24 as a more permeant body to oversee the prosecution of the crime of genocide.
Enacted on 1 July 2002, the Rome Statue established the International Criminal Court (ICC) with jurisdiction over Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and War Crimes, "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community". 25 Rights, 9, no. 3 (2005) , 349-368. 23 Ibid. 24 27 The next section of this paper details the successes of genocide prosecution worldwide, providing the sum of prosecutions to date and the organisations or bodies responsible for those prosecutions.
Prosecuting Genocide: contested success
As of January 01, 2018, there have been 150 identifiable prosecutions for genocide, although in 7 cases those found guilty were subsequently acquitted. These are prosecutions that have listed genocide as at least one of the offenses for which an individual has been found guilty. In many cases there are other offenses alongside genocide convictions, most commonly Crimes against Humanity or grave breaches of the international laws governing war (i.e. serious breaches of the Geneva Convention), however these are not detailed in these lists. The convictions for genocide are organised into three groups: those pursuant to the war in the Rwanda (Table 1) ; those pursuant to the war in the former Yugoslavia (Table 2) ; and a small number of cases across the rest of the world, including those from the ICC (Table 3 ). In the first two groups many of the convictions came through the work of the ICTY and ICTY. Despite the criticisms of these courts, they both have successfully prosecuted individuals for the crime of genocide, with the ICTR is responsible for the largest number of individual genocide trials, and for 59 convictions.
x Each table lists convictions in that group by prosecuting body and in chronological order, combining convictions together where prosecuting bodies have done so. The tables identify the specific crime for which individuals were convicted, the sentence they received, and whether that sentence was reduced, commuted or overturned on appeal. Each table is followed by some discussion on issues of importance.
Where sentences are listed as 'Life' this reflects the term given by the specific court and may vary depending on the legislation used in each case. Given the difficulties of trying the substantial number of those incarcerated and awaiting trial, in 2004 the Rwandan government developed the Gacaca system of localised, community trials that were a "relatively informal, traditional Rwandan method of conflict resolution that was adapted to meet the discerned needs of the post-genocide environment." 30 The Gacaca courts dealt predominantly with category 2, 3 and 4 cases under Organic Law, and Nwoye 31 describes the process as "a result of the domestic system's inability to deal with the huge number of back-logged genocide cases promptly". According to Human Rights Watch, of the roughly 818,000 individuals accused of crimes in the initial Gacaca phase between 2004-5, 77,000 were initially placed in Organic Law category 1 to be tried in the national court system, with the remainder of the cases sent to the Gacaca courts. 32 As of April 2012, approximately 1,951,388 cases had been tried in the Gacaca system, with a conviction rate running around 65%. The trials of political and military leaders for acts of genocide are generally well documented and included in Table 1 , however there are a multitude of other crimes associated with the genocide, such as the localised support, complicity, and/or conspiracy to commit genocide that are not included in official figures but were part of national or Gacaca trials. Therefore, it is very difficult to provide a firm number of the broader set of convictions related to genocide that came from these processes, but it is certain that many individuals were convicted of such crimes.
xiv As with the war in Rwanda, the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia resulted in convictions for crimes of genocide. Table 2 shows these convictions, including those rating to the ICTY and convictions from other courts. Artucio who was present on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists, cast doubt on the trial for "a series of irregularities" during the proceedings 33 . He argues that the charges of genocide were not legally valid as Equatorial Guinea had not ratified the 1948 convention on the prevention and punishment of genocide. Furthermore, he argues that the charges of genocide, particularly the intent to destroy a religions, national or racial group, were not proven in the case, but rather the terms "'genocide and mass murder' were used synonymously". 34 Nevertheless, the neglect of the Equatorial Guinea case represents an unfair erasure; it was the first time in which a legally defined concept of genocide was successfully prosecuted. During the trials in Equatorial Guinea genocide was cited as a crime, with a definition based on the prior Spanish civil and military definition. Despite the irregularities identified by the Artucio, the convictions in Equatorial Guinea have a genuine case to be regarded as the first for genocide. These convictions are included in Table 3 along with cases from elsewhere in the world. 
The politics of Genocide prosecution: A case study on the ICC in Africa
Of the 124 countries that are parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, 34 are African states and many of these were "deeply involved in creating the Court and all its provisions". 35 Nevertheless, there has been a persistent critique of the ICCs role in Africa, much of this from a number of African States claiming that the Court "has preoccupied itself with Africa and failed to investigate equally severe conflicts elsewhere". 36 Table 4 shows the history of ICC cases, illustrating a preponderance of cases in Africa.
Although genocide is listed in serval of the cases, convictions to date have been restricted to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes. 
Source: ICC, 2018b
xviii There is a spectrum of positions on the ICCs role in Africa, ranging from accusations of western neocolonialism to the application of legislation governing intervention. In the first instance, Abdul Tejan-Cole 37 Executive Director of the Open Society Initiative for West Africa, explains how some have gone so far as "to accuse the Court of being a neo-colonialist institution peddling a Western agenda that seeks to control African politics through ICC investigations and prosecutions". For example, Courtenay Griffiths, the lead defense attorney for former Liberian President Charles Taylor, argued that rather than operating through a desire for international justice, the ICC is acts as "a vehicle for its primarily European funders, of which the UK is one of the largest, to exert their power and influence, particularly in Africa" 38 .
Less critical, but still unfavourable interpretations of the ICCs role in Africa assert that the "Achilles heel of the ICC system revolves around the fairness of its selection process of its cases". 39 Such arguments claim that the ICC suffers from selectivism when deciding which cases to investigate and prosecute. There may be many reasons for this, but Imoedemhe 40 argues that geopolitical pressures mean that "international crimes are ignored when it is considered politically expedient to do so", and African cases are less likely to have the geopolitical influence to assert pressure to this extent.
Counter arguments to the claims of neo-colonialism and selectivism focus on the application of Complimentarity in the Rome Statue, the principle which stipulates that that it is first and foremost "the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes" 41 .
A further consequence of complimentarity is that it establishes the ICC as a court of last resort that should Despite the disagreements between the African Union, individual states, and the ICC, there is still much support for the work of the court. For instance, Keppler 51 claims that the African Union "does not reflect the range of positions that African governments have regarding the ICC". This is supported by Boehme 52 , who illustrates how the actions of the African Union created a loyalty conflict in South Africa, where the executive is torn between "its obligation to the African Union and its obligation to the ICC". The South African government has been involved for several years in a series of legal challenged around its withdrawal from the ICC, which was eventually found by the high court to be "unconstitutional and invalid". 53 Although the ICC faces a difficult role in Africa, there are many who believe "the relationship is still salvageable and could be enhanced for the mutual benefit of both institutions with a view to achieving the goal of peace and security". 55 Despite an overbalance in ICC cases in Africa, Bassiouni and Hansen argues that this does not mean the ICC should cease investigations here, but that "it needs to also investigate and prosecute crimes elsewhere". 56 As table 4 shows, there is evidence that the ICC is increasingly focusing its work outside of the African context, with 6 of the 10 preliminary cases in other continents. The only current ICC case pursuant to genocide, however, is in Africa.
Summary
Since Lemkin's inception of the crime, definitions for genocide have changed little. The subsequent use of Lemkin's crime in legation was, in the words of the Rome Statute, an international response to the idea that there are some crimes so significant that they "shock the conscience of humanity." 57 Nevertheless, the legislation is relatively new and the international responses to genocide newer still. Although the ICC has yet to convict anyone for Genocide, previous convictions in international, regional, and local courts,
show that there is a desire to pursue those responsible or complicit in this most serious of crimes.
Furthermore, bodies such as the ICTR, ICTY, and the ICC have a value that can be judged alongside the number of convictions for Genocide and the other serious crimes it tries. Hyearn and Simmons argue that the work of the ICC is more nuanced than its record of prosecutions, identifying "multiple mechanismsxxii legal and social, international and domestic-associated with the ICC's authority that can potentially deter law violation in countries prone to civil violence". 58 They identify two forms of mutually reinforcing deterrent: 59 firstly, a prosecution deterrent that derives from both the ICCs investigatory powers and from the integration into national laws of the definitions on genocide and associated crimes used by the international courts; and secondly, a social deterrent that derives from the ICCs representation of a mobilisation in the international community and in domestic civil society. This is supported by Bassiouni and Hansen, 60 who describe the ICC as "an institution with the capacity to change habits and outcomes" and by Hillebrecht 61 who argues that the "ICC's involvement in conflict does have a dampening effect on the level of mass atrocities committed". Nevertheless, the presence of the ICC has not stopped what Lemkin described over 70 years ago as "an old practice in its modern development". 62 
